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INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI) has infiltrated the administrative state.1
On December 3, 2020, the Trump Administration released an “Executive
* Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy, New York
University School of Law. Bridget Pals (NYU 2021) and Eddie Percarpio (NYU
2022) provided extraordinary research assistance. Mike Livermore provided
helpful feedback.
1. Cognizant that “[t]here is no universally accepted definition of ‘artificial
intelligence,’” this article follows the lead of the Administrative Conference of the
United States (ACUS) in defining the umbrella term broadly:
AI systems tend to have characteristics such as the ability to learn
to solve complex problems, make predictions, or undertake tasks
that heretofore have relied on human decision making or
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Order on Promoting the Use of Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in the
Federal Government.”2 As part of its “Guidance for Regulation of Artificial
Intelligence Applications,” released on November 17, 2020, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) directed agencies to “consider how best to
promote retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective,
insufficient, or excessively burdensome” and then to “modify, streamline,
expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has been learned.”3
Retrospective review of existing regulations is not a new phenomenon; the
Trump Administration followed the Obama Administration (and prior to
that, the Clinton Administration) in urging such review. But the novel use
of artificial intelligence to identify rules that should be subject to
retrospective analysis warrants attention and further exploration.
OMB’s general agency guidance followed closely on the heels of
the “Regulatory Clean Up Initiative” final rule published on November 16,
2020, by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).4 As HHS
explained:
While retrospective regulatory review and reform has until
now been a largely manual process, new technologies exist
that can support policy subject matter experts (SMEs) in
their efforts to review large amounts of regulatory text. As
part of HHS’s pioneering efforts to pilot the use of
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other advanced analyses,
HHS recently applied AI and Natural Language Processing
(NLP) technology to support and accelerate SME reviews
in cognizant divisions of HHS of unstructured text in the
intervention. There are many illustrative examples of AI that can
help frame the issue . . . . [including] AI assistants, computer
vision systems, biomedical research, unmanned vehicle systems,
advanced game-playing software, and facial recognition systems
as well as application of AI in both information technology and
operational technology.
Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Statement #20, Agency Use of Artificial Intelligence, 86
Fed. Reg. 6616 (Jan. 22, 2021).
2. E.O. 13960, The White House, Exec. Order on Promoting the Use of
Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in the Fed. Gov’t (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-promoting-usetrustworthy-artificial-intelligence-federal-government/ [https://perma.cc/U294-9P2
2] [hereinafter E.O. 13960].
3. Memorandum from Russell T. Vought, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications, at 11 (Nov. 17,
2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Draft-OMBMemo-on-Regulation-of-AI-1-7-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/H39P-L297] [hereinafter
OMB AI Memo]. OMB noted that its guidance was in accordance with Exec. Order
No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
4. Regulatory Clean Up Initiative, 85 Fed. Reg. 72899 (Nov. 16, 2020).
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Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), facilitating the
identification of opportunities to improve HHS’s
regulations.5
The “Regulatory Clean Up Initiative” rule made non-substantive changes to
existing HHS regulations, such as “correcting references to other
regulations, misspellings, and other typographical errors.”6
The seemingly mundane nature of this final rule, however, should
not obscure its revolutionary import. To begin, it is (as far as I am aware)
the first use of AI in a final rule and one that has (thus far) escaped
widespread attention. This particular use case for AI in rulemaking was
overlooked in “Government by Algorithm: Artificial Intelligence in Federal
Administrative Agencies,” a February 2020 comprehensive report (for
which I served as one of four lead authors) that surveyed AI use cases
across federal agencies.7 This Article adds to our understanding of those
federal agency AI use cases, specifically with regard to rulemaking
applications.
Beyond buttressing our understanding of agencies’ current and
potential future uses of AI in rulemaking, this Article spotlights HHS’s
innovative use of AI in the retrospective review process. The “Regulatory
Clean Up Initiative” is HHS’s opening gambit, the first rule to emerge out
of a years-long pilot project. Back in September 2019, at a presentation at
The White House Summit on Artificial Intelligence in Government, the
HHS Associate Deputy Secretary discussed a pilot project underway using
AI to assist agencies’ retrospective review process by identifying outdated
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. David Freeman Engstrom et al., Government by Algorithm: Artificial
Intelligence in Federal Administrative Agencies, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. REP.,
(Feb. 2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS
-AI-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/38AW-SPXC]. The Administrative Conference of
the United States (ACUS), an independent federal agency that convenes experts to
recommend improvements to administrative process and procedure, commissioned
this study on the current uses of artificial intelligence in the federal administrative
state. ACUS’s follow-on Statement on “Agency Use of Artificial Intelligence” (see
supra note 1), which aimed to explore how federal regulatory agencies can “take
advantage of these new tools in ways consistent with due process and other legal
norms” likewise did not address the context of retrospective review or rulemaking
more generally. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Statement #20, Agency Use of Artificial
Intelligence, (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Statement%2020%20Agency%20Use%20of%20Artificial%20Intelligence.pdf.
Presumably the AI uses in retrospective review across different agencies—
hitherto largely below the radar—will surface, as the December 3, 2020, Exec.
Order mandates that “each agency shall prepare an inventory of its non-classified
and non-sensitive use cases of AI . . . including current and planned uses, consistent
with the agency’s mission.” E.O. 13960, supra note 2.
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or overly burdensome rules or areas of duplication and overlap among
agencies.8 And now, within the November 2020 rule itself, HHS has
signaled broader expansions and future rulemaking uses of the AI-driven
technologies: “Future uses of these technologies to promote comprehensive
and systematic retrospective review will continue to algorithmically refine
identification of potentially ‘outmoded’ regulations and will seek
algorithmic characterization of . . . regulations which are ‘ineffective,
insufficient, or excessively burdensome,’ as candidates for SME review and
potential reform.”9
This Article is the first to explore the significant administrative law
issues that agencies will face as they devise and implement AI-enhanced
strategies to identify rules that should be subject to retrospective review.
Part I introduces the effect of politics on retrospective review by canvassing
both the consistencies and differing emphases of the relevant executive
orders across the Obama and Trump Administrations. The HHS pilot is then
presented as an innovative case study in its own right that also frames some
generalizable salient administrative law design and oversight issues. In
addition to promulgating the first rule using AI technologies, HHS has
historically provided robust descriptions of its approach to identifying
regulations for retrospective review. HHS, moreover, has put itself forward
as the leading federal agency for “regulatory reform.”10
Part II sheds light on both the peril and future promise of the
deployment of AI in the retrospective review process. AI could provide a
reliable and efficient mechanism to help agency policy officials sift through
the thousands of pages of the CFR and target regulations of particular
interest. Alternatively, it could instead be deployed to obscure the inputs
and decision-making process to fuel a politically motivated agenda (either
pro- or anti-regulatory). Against the backdrop of scant information provided
8. HHS ADS Charles Keckler, THE WHITE HOUSE SUMMIT ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IN GOV’T (Sept. 2019) (PowerPoint slides, on file with Belmont Law
Review); see also Tajha Chappellet-Lanier, White House AI Summit focuses on
government as a user of the technology, FEDSCOOP (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.fedscoop.com/white-house-ai-summit-government-ai-use-cases/
[https://perma.cc/5HQG-BA2Y] (“Charles Keckler . . . shared the agency’s ‘AI for
deregulation’ pilot. The project, which began one year ago, aims to use natural
language processing to find HHS regulations that may be too burdensome, obsolete
or ineffective. The end goal, after subject matter expert review, is to eliminate or
change these regulations in order to streamline the HHS regulatory environment.”).
9. Regulatory Clean Up Initiative, 85 Fed. Reg. at 72899–900.
10. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. ANN. REP. (2019); see also
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Secretary Azar Highlights
Recognition of HHS as Top Agency for Regulatory Reform (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/10/17/secretary-azar-highlights-recognitionof-hhs-as-top-agency-for-regulatory-reform.html [https://perma.cc/TN2H-U55Y]
(reporting that Secretary Azar noted that “HHS was the No. 1 Cabinet agency in
terms of regulatory accomplishments for Fiscal Year 2018”).
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by HHS regarding its AI-driven approach to target regulations for
retrospective review, this Part investigates potential factors that could
predict which regulations may be overly burdensome, overlapping, or
insufficiently stringent. One such factor might include whether the
regulation’s cost-benefit analysis aligns with current best practices. Another
factor might leverage NLP techniques to reveal patterns in comments
regarding the sentiment of the regulated community with regard to the
burden of a particular regulation.
Finally, as AI infiltrates the administrative state, concerns regarding
transparency, reasonableness, accountability, and oversight rear their heads.
Part III tackles future challenges to be faced in the realm of AI for
retrospective review. It is conventional received wisdom that the informal
rulemaking process under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
provides “predictable and meaningful opportunities for interested
stakeholders to provide input on draft regulations and scrutinize the
evidence and analytic bases of regulatory proposals.”11 In its November
2020 “Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications,”
OMB carried this conventional wisdom into the 21st century, by
emphasizing that “[i]n soliciting public input on Notices of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRMs) that relate to AI applications, agencies will benefit
from the perspectives and expertise of stakeholders engaged in the design,
development, deployment, operation, and impact of AI applications, and
facilitate a decisionmaking process that is more transparent and
accountable.”12 But HHS’s “Regulatory Clean Up Initiative” rule was not
subject to the notice-and-comment process. The rule, moreover, offered
only the most general description of the AI-driven NLP techniques used.
While heeding OMB’s caution that “current technical challenges in creating
interpretable AI can make it difficult for agencies to ensure a level of
transparency necessary for humans to understand the decision-making of AI
applications,”13 Part III proposes enhanced public participation and noticeand-comment processes as necessary features of AI-driven retrospective
review.
I. RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW
The value of retrospective review—namely re-assessing the costs
and benefits of regulations sometime after they are promulgated—has been
recognized by Democratic and Republican administrations alike. The
Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) requires agencies to publish plans to
conduct retrospective reviews of certain regulations.14 Multiple executive

11.
12.
13.
14.

OMB AI Memo, supra note 3, at 12.
Id.
Id. at 11.
5 U.S.C. § 610 (2009) (providing for the periodic review of rules).
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orders from the Obama and Trump Administrations likewise require
agencies to submit plans for periodic reviews of certain regulations.15
That said, the Obama and Trump Administrations approached
retrospective review in distinct manners. Most significantly, the Trump
Administration injected a pronounced deregulatory thrust into the
regulatory review process, reflected in its executive orders and ultimately
shaping the process by which agencies targeted regulations ripe for review.
A. Executive Order Politics
With Executive Order 13,563, the Obama Administration urged
retrospective review, seeking to eliminate regulations that had become
“unjustified or unnecessary” or “outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or
excessively burdensome.”16 Agencies, moreover, were required to create
and publish Final Retrospective Review Plans.17 My review of these agency
plans revealed several commonalities across agencies’ processes for
targeting regulations for review.18 Typically, the agency plans drew
attention to the number of people impacted by a regulation as well as the
date the regulation was promulgated and the time since its most recent
review. Next, most plans provided for the solicitation of comments, both
internally from staff and fieldworkers and also from the general public.
Several agency plans noted the relevance of the receipt of complaints
regarding specific regulations or where the agency is continually granting
compliance waivers.
Agency plans also share similarities in the types of regulatory
features they target for retrospective review. Complexity, for instance,
emerged as a relevant feature, with agencies indicating a preference for
clear, concise, and readily comprehensible rules. Most plans also identified
changes in technological circumstances or changes in legal circumstances,
such as the enactment of a new statute or amendment, a United States
15. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993);
Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
16. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13563 § 6, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 (Jan. 21,
2011) (promoting retrospective analysis to identify rules that “may be outmoded,
ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome”). Exec. Order No. 13563 built
on the Clinton Administration Exec. Order No. 12866 § 5, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735,
51739–40 (Oct. 4, 1993) (urging review of regulations to determine which ones
have become “unjustified or unnecessary” or “duplicative or inappropriately
burdensome in the aggregate”).
17. Exec. Order No. 12866 § 5, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (requiring each agency to
create a preliminary “program. . . under which the agency will periodically review
its existing significant regulations”).
18. All of the agency plans—which contain the required preliminary and final
plans along with February 2015, July 2015, January 2016, and July 2016 updates—
are publicly available at: Office of Mgmt. & Budget, https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/omb/oira/regulation-reform [https://perma.cc/WZL4-EKCJ].
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Supreme Court decision interpreting a statute or amendment, or an update
to a referenced regulation. Many plans also highlighted necessary updates
to the cost-benefit evaluation of a regulation, whether based on new
understandings or ability to measure the relevant costs and benefits, or the
distributional effects of the regulation, or a re-assessment based on the real
world impacts of the regulation. Finally, most plans evinced a concern
regarding duplication of effort among agencies.
The Trump Administration pushed this retrospective review
mandate a step further. Executive Order 13,771 created a “regulatory
budget,” requiring that, for each additional significant regulation, two
existing regulations had to be eliminated and that the total incremental cost
of all regulations should be no greater than zero.19 In furtherance of this
demand, the Trump Administration required agencies to create Regulatory
Review Task Forces (RRTFs) charged with identifying regulations that,
among other things, “eliminate jobs, or inhibit job creation,” “are outdated,
unnecessary, or ineffective,” and “impose costs that exceed benefits.”20
Unlike the Obama Administration E.O. 13,563, the Trump
Administration E.O. 13,771 does not call for agencies to submit plans. That
said, my review of available agency statements from fall 2019 revealed
some consistency across administrations.
For instance, both
administrations flag regulations as ripe for review based upon the age of a
regulation, the amount of time since a regulation has gone through a
comprehensive review, the frequency of a regulation’s amendments, and
subsequent legal developments.21
Finally, Trump Administration Executive Order 13,924, Regulatory
Relief to Support Economic Recovery, called for a specialized additional
retrospective review by canvassing recent rule changes and relaxations
conducted in response to COVID-19. This retrospective review pilot22 asked
each agency to consider all of the changes made in response to COVID-19
and determine whether or not those changes should remain permanently in
effect.23 Under E.O. 13,924, agencies are required to report their findings to
19. Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
20. Exec. Order No. 13777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12285 (Feb. 24, 2017).
21. For example, hand-in-hand with considering the age of a regulation, the
Department of Veteran Affairs noted that some of their regulations are out of date
in that they fail to incorporate court holdings and binding Veteran Affairs General
Counsel opinions. See PLAN FOR PERIODIC REVIEW OF EXISTING REGULATIONS,
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERAN AFF. at 3 (Aug. 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-regulatory-action-plans/veteransaffairsregulatory
reformplanaugust2011.pdf.
22. Adam White, Covid-19, Regulatory Recalibration, and Learning for the
Long Run, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (May 20, 2020),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/covid-19-regulatory-recalibration-and-learning-forthe-long-run/ [https://perma.cc/7PF8-EQ6W].
23. Exec. Order No. 13924, 85 Fed. Reg. 31353 (May 22, 2020), mandates:
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the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).24 But these lists are not
publicly available.25 While there have been myriad COVID-related federal
The heads of all agencies shall review any regulatory standards
they have temporarily rescinded, suspended, modified, or waived
during the public health emergency, any such actions they take
pursuant to . . . this order, and other regulatory flexibilities they
have implemented in response to COVID-19, whether before or
after issuance of this order, and determine which, if any, would
promote economic recovery if made permanent, insofar as doing
so is consistent with the policy considerations identified in . . .
this order, and report the results of such review to the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the
President for Domestic Policy, and the Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy.
24. OMB followed up with a memo to the heads of executive departments and
agencies, requiring, among other things:
A list of temporary regulatory actions the agency has taken in
response to COVID-19 along with analysis of whether each such
action is suitable for issuance as a permanent measure to promote
economic recovery. For each action suitable for issuance as a
permanent measure, please also include a brief description of
why each proposed action will promote economic recovery going
forward; the projected timeline for issuance of a permanent
regulatory action; any good cause, exigent circumstance, or
emergency authorities the agency intends to invoke for issuance;
and any other important and pertinent information.
Russell T. Vought, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies: Implementation of Executive Order 13,924, OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET (June 9, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/
M-20-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD7M-RWCM]. Agencies were given two weeks to
complete these tasks. Id.
Much of the engagement, to date, with Exec. Order No. 13924, including
OMB’s most substantial guidance, has focused on enforcement discretion as
opposed to rulemaking. Paul Ray, Memorandum for the Deputy Secretaries of
Executive Departments and Agencies: Implementation of Section 6 of Executive
Order 13924, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/M-20-31.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9B48-BP8V].
25. Moreover, there are only a handful of references to Exec. Order No.
13924 in the Federal Register and none of them invokes retrospective review. Each
of the surfaced examples represented a rollback or delay in compliance
requirements, but none of them referenced the part of Exec. Order No. 13924 that
deals with retrospective review of temporary rollbacks. See, e.g., Safety Standard
for Hand-Held Infant Carriers, 85 Fed. Reg. 46000 (July 31, 2020) (Consumer
Safety Protection Commission delayed the effective date for a new rule regarding
hand-held infant carriers to the end of the calendar year); Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards; Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid and Electric Vehicles,
85 Fed. Reg. 54273 (Sept. 1, 2020) (National Highway Traffic and Safety

382

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 374

regulatory rollbacks, both before and after the release of E.O. 13,924, the
retrospective review process recommended by the Executive Order has not
yet manifested in a clear way.26
B. HHS Case Study
Historically, under the Obama Administration, the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) provided robust accounts of its
retrospective review process.27 HHS committed to a retrospective review
effort as part of its “Regulatory Reform and Simplification” goal laid out in
its most recent strategic plan, covering 2018-22.28 Under the Trump
Administration delayed the effective date for vehicle safety standards and
minimum sound requirements for hybrid and electric vehicles by six months, in
response to a petition); Medicare Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 50074, 50119–200 (Aug.
17, 2020) (Centers for Medicare/Medicaid Services (CMS), in a proposed
rulemaking regarding CY 2021 Revisions to Payment Policies, sought comment on
whether it would be advantageous to allow practitioners to bill and be paid based
on shorter monitoring periods than historically available, when using remote
physiologic monitoring (RPM). CMS requested these comments in line with Exec.
Order No. 13924’s urging for deregulatory actions.); Policy Statement on
Passenger Vessel Financial Responsibility, 85 Fed. Reg. 49600, 49600 (Aug. 14,
2020) (Federal Maritime Commission published a policy statement “to provide
guidance on possible regulatory relief with respect to COVID-19’s unprecedented
economic effects to passenger vessel operators”; in particular, the policy offers
alternatives to evaluating passenger vessel operators’ financial responsibility
related to “nonperformance of transportation and death or injury to passengers.”);
Limited Extension of Relief for Certain Persons and Operations During the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg.
38763 (June 29, 2020) (The Federal Aviation Administration and Department of
Transportation extended additional relief to flight operators, waiving “certain
training, recent experience, testing, and checking requirements.”).
26. Similarly, the EPA rolled back enforcement of many environmental
standards for the first several months of the crisis. COVID-19 Enforcement and
Compliance Resources, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/covid-19enforcement-and-compliance-resources [https://perma.cc/SY2J-G63F] (last visited
Sept. 12, 2020). These are precisely the types of rescissions that could eventually
lead to a re-examination of pre-COVID practices and, consequently, future
deregulatory rulemakings.
27. HHS was already actively engaged in retrospective review prior to Obama
E.O. 13,563, based on requirements from the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
congressional appropriations, changes in “technology, new data or other
information, or legislative change” and in response to rulemaking petitions. See
Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., Preliminary Regulatory Reform Plan at 5 OFFICE
OF MGMT. & BUDGET (May 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/oira
/regulation-reform [https://perma.cc/6C9E-U7LP] (also describing revisions HHS
has made in response to retrospective review activities).
28. See Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), Overview:
HHS Strategic Plan, FY 2018-2022, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS.
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Administration, HHS touted itself as the “top agency for regulatory reform”
and the “top federal agency in reducing regulatory burden.”29 It also
emerged as a federal agency leader in experimenting with AI. This section
compares and contrasts the “old-fashioned” approach to retrospective
review under both the Obama and Trump Administrations to the more
recent “AI for deregulation” approach taken up under the Trump
Administration.
1. The “Old-Fashioned” Approach
Under the Obama Administration, HHS provided a robust
description of its approach to identifying regulations for retrospective
review, which encompassed several steps.30 First (as is typical across most
Obama era agencies’ retrospective review plans), the agency would take
inventory of all existing significant regulations, including information on
when the regulation was originally promulgated, its most recent
modification, and the reason for the modification. More specifically, each
agency within HHS would develop a list to review over the subsequent twoyear period, identifying significant regulations that had been operational for
at least five years since originally promulgated and not yet reviewed.
Second (again consistent with the factors flagged across agency plans),
agencies within HHS incorporated public comments and feedback on which
regulations would be good candidates for retrospective review, including
(somewhat more expansively than other agencies) by examining past
comments from town hall meetings, public comments, and internet portals.
Next, each agency prioritized regulations to review, beginning with
regulations that “agencies can easily modify, streamline, or rescind” and
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/strategic-plan/overview/index.html#
overview [https://perma.cc/TBG2-7ERD]. Every four years, HHS updates its
strategic plan in conformance with the Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA) of 1933 and the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. Pub. L. 103-62 and
Pub. L. 111-352, respectively. Id. HHS laid out five departmental strategic goals:
(1) Reform, Strengthen, and Modernize the Nation’s Healthcare System; (2) Protect
the Health of Americans Where They Live, Learn, Work, and Play; (3) Strengthen
the Economic and Social Well-being of Americans Across the Lifespan; (4) Foster
Sound, Sustained Advances in the Sciences; and (5) Promote Effective and
Efficient Management and Stewardship. Id. This last goal, and more particularly its
subtheme titled “Regulatory Reform and Simplification,” houses HHS’s
retrospective review effort. Id.
29. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 43
(2019) [hereinafter 2019 ANNUAL REPORT]. HHS measured its success through
reducing the present-value economic burden of its regulations by $11.4 billion and
touting making forty-six “deregulatory actions” compared with eighteen
“regulatory actions.” Id.
30. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR
RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW OF EXISTING RULES 4–5 (May 18, 2011).
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then proceeding to consider remaining regulations in accordance with the
goal of developing a “streamlined, robust, and balanced regulatory
framework.”31
Delving more into the precise targeted features of regulations
signaling ripeness for review, HHS urged agencies to identify regulations
that required updating in light of changing technology. HHS also urged
agencies to focus on reducing reporting and record-keeping burdens and to
eliminate outdated provisions.32 In a similar vein, HHS encouraged
agencies to determine whether the regulation was meeting its objectives or,
more specifically, to consider whether it could be replaced with a “less
proscriptive” activity.33 In line with this, agencies were asked to identify
regulations that could be replaced with guidance, incentives, public
disclosure, or other non-regulatory measures. Finally, HHS urged its
agencies to evaluate whether the regulation was effective.34 Specifically,
HHS aimed to move towards incorporating evaluations within its
regulations.35
The July 2015 update from HHS outlined the progress made on the
retrospective review of twelve regulations, which sheds light on the types of
regulations undergoing modification.36 For example, in the Medicare
Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, HHS increased
transparency in reimbursement proceedings. HHS credited its success to
public comments and economic analysis, reporting an annual savings from
the final rule of $240 million as compared to the prior rule.37 Another
example is the Head Start Performance Standards, which updated 15-year
old education standards as required by the Improving Head Start for School
Readiness Act of 2007.38 HHS reduced the number of requirements by 40%
31. Id. at 4.
32. HHS provided additional information on some of their previous successful
uses of retrospective review. Id. at app. B. Rationales that HHS used to identify
regulations (79) for retrospective review: of the twenty-three “department-wide”
initiatives, the vast majority of regulations were justified based on changes in
circumstances or technology (13), followed by efforts to reduce paperwork (7), and
“clean up” or eliminate outdated provisions (3). Id. Other regulations, however,
were simply identified as agency priorities without additional information. Id.
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id.
35. For example, the Graphic Warning labels on Cigarette Packs included a
mechanism to evaluate the effectiveness of the labels. See FDA Proposes New
Health Warnings for Cigarette Packs and Ads, FDA (May 1, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/labeling-and-warning-statements-tobaccoproducts/fda-proposes-new-health-warnings-cigarette-packs-and-ads [https://perma
.cc/C84N-ZPQV].
36. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., HHS RETROSPECTIVE
REVIEW UPDATE 1 (July 2015).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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and reorganized for clarity. HHS cited “extensive consultation with
researchers, practitioners . . . and other experts.”39 Aside from these rules
and proposed rules, HHS noted several anticipated regulatory activities.40 A
year later, the July 2016 report described 61 regulations that had been
flagged for retrospective review.41 HHS pointed to the role of public
comments and conversations with stakeholders in modifying these
regulations as well as changed circumstances and outdatedness of a rule.
HHS does not have retrospective review reports after 2016 and, as
mentioned above, the Trump Administration E.O. 13,771 did not require
agencies to publish reports.42 HHS did, however, provide some information
about the progress of its RRTF and its deregulatory actions under E.O.
13,771. In particular, HHS identified 126 potential deregulatory actions in
2018 and 2019—far more than the agency could implement.43 The
characteristics tracked by HHS incorporated comments from public input
and peer review, showing some consistency with earlier aims of
retrospective review.44 As of 2018, HHS estimated its recent regulatory
reforms would reduce paperwork by 53 million hours and save $5.2
billion.45

39. Id. Other examples include: (1) Reform of Requirements for Long-Term
Care Facilities, a proposed rule that revised the requirements for Long-Term Care
facilities, with an aim of increasing flexibility in care provisions; HHS again cited
public comment and industry feedback. Id. at 2; (2) Veterinary Feed Directives rule
that streamlined certain veterinary processes and claimed a more cost-effective
regulatory program, leading to annual savings of $7.87 million. Id.; (3) Medicaid
Managed Care, proposed rule developed through public comment, on-the-ground
feedback from state partners, “aligns” Medicaid rules with other major health
coverage rules (such as Qualified Health Plans and Medicare Advantage Plans). Id.
at 3.
40. See id. at 3–10.
41. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., HHS JULY 2016
RETROSPECTIVE REPORT (July 2016). Of the flagged rules, twenty-six were
“completed,” four were “new” (e.g. they had not previously been included in a
retrospective analysis update), and the remainder were ongoing. Id.
42. See Retrospective Review of Existing Rules, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/open/retrospective-review/
index.html [https://perma.cc/29NW-4L6W]; Exec. Order 13771, 82 Fed. Reg.
9,339 (Jan. 30, 2017).
43. Office of Budget, FY 2021 Annual Performance Plan and Report Regulatory Reform, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/fy2021/performance/index.html [https://perma.c
c/W9UU-WBLL].
44. Id.
45. Secretary Azar Highlights Recognition of HHS as Top Agency for
Regulatory Reform, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/10/17/secretary-azar-highlights-recognitionof-hhs-as-top-agency-for-regulatory-reform.html [https://perma.cc/NP4J-3366].
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Beyond this, HHS’s regulatory agenda lends further insight. The
preamble to the regulatory agenda for FY2019 covers a wide array of both
regulatory and deregulatory actions; however, it does not clearly tie in
elements of retrospective review.46 Some deregulatory actions are justified
based on “additional flexibilit[y],”47 “clearer federal guidance,”48 and a
reduction in “burdensome and costly regulations.”49 However, a closer look
shows that HHS targeted the Affordable Care Act’s nondiscrimination
requirements (which it justified based on Paperwork Reduction Act
requirements), revised regulations to limit “burdens on religious freedom
and conscience,” and took steps to address “the failings of the Affordable
Care Act.”50 It is thus difficult to discern whether HHS’s retrospective
review-based justifications or, instead, more overtly political justifications
were the actual driving forces behind the deregulatory actions.
It is not yet clear, moreover, how much progress HHS made with
respect to its COVID-19 centered deregulatory retrospective review. For
example, HHS allowed a large telehealth expansion in April 2020—a
month before E.O. 13,924 was issued.51 That expansion was tied to a
relaxation of the enforcement of Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPPA) standards, allowing doctors to use platforms,
such as Skype and FaceTime, that are not HIPPA compliant.52 HHS has not
yet issued a rulemaking or guidance document regarding any permanent
changes.53
Finally, on November 4, 2020, HHS published a notice of proposed
rulemaking, “Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations
Timely,” that would automatically sunset regulations after 10 years in order
46. Statement of Regulatory Priorities for Fiscal Year 2020, OFF. OF INFO.
REG. AFF. 1 (last visited May 11, 2020), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/e
Agenda/StaticContent/201910/Statement_0900_HHS.pdf [https://perma.cc/U54QYGHH].
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 2–3.
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id. at 2, 3, 8.
51. See Council of Economic Advisers, Deregulation Sparks Dramatic
Telehealth Increase During the COVID-19 Response, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 28,
2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/deregulation-sparks-dramatic-tele
health-increase-covid-19-response/ [https://perma.cc/6RRZ-UZZF].
52. Id.
53. See Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (ASPA), Telehealth: Delivering
Care Safely During Covid-19, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS. (July 15,
2020), https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/telehealth/index.html [https://perma.cc/A
Y7N-6Y7G]. While the Federal Communications Commission has issued funding
to expand telehealth, that funding was released prior to HHS enacting the
enforcement discretion guidance and well before Exec. Order 13294. See
Promoting Telehealth for Low-Income Consumers; COVID-19 Telehealth
Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 19892 (Apr. 9, 2020) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 54).
AND
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“to incentivize periodical retrospective review.”54 According to HHS, “one
of the most important factors for ensuring agencies conduct retrospective
reviews of their regulations is to provide for the sunset or automatic
expiration of certain regulatory requirements after a period of time unless a
retrospective review determines that the regulations should be
maintained.”55 In essence, this rule would invert the baseline for
retrospective review in a dramatically deregulatory direction—rather than
the agency selecting regulations to modify or rescind, an agency must select
a regulation for review in order for the regulation to continue in force. The
final version of this rule was promulgated on January 19, 2021, and gave
HHS an additional five years to review any rules that are overdue for
retrospective review under the sunset provision.56
HHS’s version of regulatory reform in response to E.O. 13,771 and
13,777 consistently emphasized its outsized number of “deregulatory
actions and negative net cost” of all its actions. It is against this backdrop
that we next consider its pilot project of introducing AI-driven technologies
into its retrospective review process—which it has dubbed “AI for
Deregulation.”57
2. “AI for Deregulation”
The Trump Administration’s deregulatory thrust, injected into the
old-fashioned retrospective review approach continued from the Obama
Administration, is a solid pillar in the HHS “AI for Deregulation” strategy.
Where AI meets retrospective review, the Trump Administration has urged,
across the board, that “[i]n conducting such retrospective reviews, agencies
54. The NPRM imposed automatic expiration of all regulations “at the end of
(1) two calendar years after the year that this proposed rule first becomes effective,
(2) ten calendar years after the year of the regulation’s promulgation, or (3) ten
calendar years after the last year in which the Department assessed and, if required,
reviewed the regulation, whichever is latest.” Securing Updated and Necessary
Statutory Evaluations Timely, 85 Fed. Reg. 70096, 70097 (Nov. 4, 2020).
55. Id.
56. The Final Rule stated:
HHS finalizes this rule to provide that, subject to certain
exceptions, all regulations issued by the Secretary or his
delegates or sub-delegates . . . shall expire at the end of (1) five
calendar years after the year that this final rule first becomes
effective, (2) ten calendar years after the year of the Section’s
promulgation, or (3) ten calendar years after the last year in
which the Department Assessed and, if required, Reviewed the
Section, whichever is latest.
See Final Rule: Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely, 86
Fed. Reg. 5694 (Jan. 19, 2021) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 200, 300, 403,
1010, and 1390).
57. Keckler, supra note 8; Chappellet-Lanier, supra note 8.
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can determine whether regulatory changes are necessary to remove barriers
to the adoption of net beneficial AI systems by identifying and
promulgating deregulatory actions, consistent with Executive Orders
13771, ‘Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,’ and
13777, ‘Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda.’”58 The Trump
Administration thereby wielded AI as yet another potential motivator for its
broader deregulatory agenda.59
As mentioned at the outset, HHS pioneered the first rule to
incorporate AI-driven technologies.60 In its “Regulatory Clean Up
Initiative” final rule (published on November 16, 2020), HHS described its
pilot program using a new method of regulatory analysis, “an AI-driven
tool that analyzed HHS’s regulations using NLP as applied to the regulatory
text in the CFR.”61 As HHS explained:
This NLP analysis is designed to accelerate and augment
expert review, by highlighting “candidate” provisions that
could be outmoded, allowing HHS SMEs to focus on these
provisions as potential areas of opportunity for
modernization. The NLP analysis revealed numerous
reform opportunities, including instances where a
regulation citation is now incorrect. Combined with the
policy expertise of HHS SMEs, this NLP analysis method
has yielded promising results towards reforming and
modernizing regulations at HHS.62
HHS’s rule was released without much fanfare and without much
foreshadowing—notwithstanding the fact that it emerged out of a yearslong pilot project within HHS to deploy artificial intelligence in
retrospective review.63 At the September 2019 White House Summit on
Artificial Intelligence in Government, the HHS Deputy Secretary presented
58. OMB AI Memo, supra note 3, at 11 (referencing Exec. Order No. 13771,
Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339) (Jan.
30, 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.p
df [https://perma.cc/P2VW-M6HD]; Exec. Order No. 13777, Enforcing the
Regulatory Reform Agenda, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ZH6-8SER].
59. The unexplored underlying assumption here is that regulations actually
impede agencies’ ability to adopt AI systems.
60. Regulatory Clean Up Initiative, 85 Fed. Reg. 72899 (Nov. 16, 2020).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., HHS Launches First-of-its-Kind
Regulatory Clean-Up Initiative Utilizing AI, HHS.GOV (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/11/17/hhs-launches-first-its-kindregulatory-clean-up-initiative-utilizing-ai.html [https://perma.cc/4RY5-X4HY].
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AI for Deregulation which laid out a few of its findings based on the pilot
project underway: 85% of HHS regulations created before 1990 had not
been edited; HHS had nearly 300 broken citation references in the CFR;
there were more than fifty instances of triplicate reporting requirements;
and there were 114 parts in the CFR with no regulatory entity listed.64 At
that time, in terms of prioritizing ways for technology to accelerate
regulatory reform HHS ranked, as first, “identifying potentially outdated
regulations.”65 Despite this, scouring the publicly available HHS annual
reports and budget proposals, only a few references to this innovative AI
use case surfaced. HHS debuted the use of AI in regulatory reform in its
2019 Annual Report (released on February 2, 2020).66 The Deputy
Secretary’s Office initiated an experimental AI-enabled review of all HHS
regulations that identified “hundreds of technical errors and over 50
opportunities to remove paperwork submission requirements – especially
outdated requirements like faxes.”67
The 2021 Budget (published only 18 days later), confirmed these
modest ambitions for AI, but also left the door open for more ambitious
uses of AI to “modernize regulations.”68 HHS allocated an $8 million

64. Keckler, supra note 8; Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory
Evaluations Timely, 85 Fed. Reg. 70096, 70101–02 (Nov. 4, 2020).
65. Id.
66. With regard to the use of AI outside of its regulatory reform effort, HHS
mentioned the following: (1) use of AI in its “Buy Smarter” initiative for
acquisitions of goods and services. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 44,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/2019-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ
K4-5L5X]; (2) an FDA plan to make a more “digital, traceable, and safer food
system” through sensor networks, blockchain, and AI. Id. at 32; (3) setting up a
neural net to speed up analysis of security data through the OCIO. Id. at 46; and (4)
a collaboration with industry to use AI to match patients with clinical trials through
the CTO. Id.
HHS’ 2018 Annual Report likewise contained a few references to the use
of AI. U.S. DEP’T OF HHS, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT (2018), https://www.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/2018-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WCP-55YY]. The
HHS CTO focused on leveraging AI to “improv[e] experimental therapy, matching
clinical trials, and responding to Lyme disease.” Id. at 24. AI’s use is flagged in
ReImagine HHS’s “Buy Smarter” effort to improve acquisitions of goods and
services. Id. at 40 (mentioning the development of a “secure, immutable automated
data layer to provide the HHS workforce with real-time, agency-wide data for
effective decision making throughout the acquisition process”). However, there
was no mention of AI with regard to deregulation or regulatory review and
simplification. Nor was it mentioned in adjacent sections on “Building Budgetary
and Operational Excellence” or “Maximizing the Promise of Data.”
67. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 43.
68. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., FY 2021 BUDGET IN BRIEF 13
(content last reviewed Feb. 20, 2020) [hereinafter FY 2021 BUDGET IN BRIEF].
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budget increase to support the agency-wide AI strategy.69 As part of its
“regulatory reduction” effort, HHS “used an Artificial Intelligence-driven
regulation analysis tool and expert insight to analyze the Code of Federal
Regulations, seeking potential opportunities to modernize regulations.”70
The 2021 budget describes the AI’s function as “reviewing and—where a
change is warranted— . . . addressing incorrect citations and eliminating the
submission of triplicate or quadruplicate of the same citation.”71
II. THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF AI FOR RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW
The use of AI-driven technologies holds enormous promise to
revolutionize the process of retrospective review; at the same time, it poses
challenges and sheds new light on addressing conventionally framed threats
to the administrative state such as transparency and democratic
accountability.72
From a good governance standpoint, AI could dramatically
improve the existing manual, labor-intensive process by which agencies
sort through regulations for retrospective review. One could imagine a
rulemaking that sets up an automated search process that uses some
algorithm to propose rules for review.73 AI technologies could assist in
identifying variables that may have predictive power for whether or not an
agency would consider a regulation to be ripe for retrospective review. To
begin, the technologies can vastly enhance the efficiency of sorting based
on pre-defined criteria. For example, regulations that are legally binding
(and can be tagged based upon language such as “shall” or “must”) are

69. The 2021 Budget referenced several uses of AI at several agencies and
departments within HHS: (1) FDA: import screening; review of adverse event
reports; identification of potential problems associated with chronic consumption
of food constituents and contaminants, and promote AI medical devices. Id. at 25;
(2) NIH: deepen understanding of underlying causes of chronic diseases and
identify successful early treatments. Id. at 58 (The budget provides $50 million to
utilize AI in this effort.); (3) Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS):
rapid review of chart documentation to improve payment accuracy to reduce
improper payments, prevent fraud, and target bad actors regarding Medicare. Id. at
99; also, to predict unplanned hospital admissions and adverse events. Id. at 133;
(4) Administration for Community Living (ACL): in-home AI “to facilitate
communication and food-ordering and increase knowledge and self-management of
chronic diseases to reduce hospitalizations.” Id. at 161.
70. FY 2021 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 68, at 13.
71. Id. at 13–14.
72. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., supra note 1.
73. This could also avoid some of the classic problems with retrospective
analysis—namely that the agencies charged with retrospective review are expected
to criticize their own work. So taking their hands off might help facilitate and
legitimate the selection of rules for review. I thank Mike Livermore for this insight.
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promising candidates in terms of narrowing the relevant domain to
regulations most likely to impact the regulatory environment.74
Historically, with regard to “old-fashioned” retrospective review,
federal agencies responded to democratic pressure when formulating their
respective agendas and in deciding whether and how to revise rules. The
introduction of AI tools into this process might give the impression that
neutral principles flag regulations that are due to be revisited via a
predictive, supervised learning approach. If that is so, then agencies should
be able to justify and defend how such tools are deployed. Agencies,
moreover, should explain how they identify a suitable training data set of
regulations to refine the operative algorithms.75 Here is where disclosure,
public participation, and oversight are key to guard against some of the
perils of the use of AI.
The Institute of Policy Integrity (IPI) at NYU School of Law
promulgated some guiding principles for retrospective review in 2011
(prior to any emphatically pro-regulatory or pro-deregulatory stance from
the White House).76 Many of the agency retrospective review plans
described above referenced IPI’s guidelines.77 Particularly relevant to the
analysis here, IPI cautioned that retrospective reviews should avoid both
deregulatory and pro-regulatory biases and should instead calibrate
regulatory programs for improved efficiency and effectiveness.78
74. This is included in the functionality of RegData (discussed infra Section
II.A.1).
75. Consider a dataset of regulations labeled “0” or “1” that is used to train
supervised learning algorithms used to target regulations for retrospective review.
Without information about the labeling process—for example, is it the result of a
political process within the agency to target certain sectors, or turned over to
industry rating systems—it is difficult to evaluate the process.
76. See Institute for Policy Integrity, Comments on Reducing Regulatory
Burden: Retrospective Review Under Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 10526
(Mar. 28, 2011), https://policyintegrity.org/documents/Policy_Integrity_Comments
_on_DOI_Retrospective_Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EHM2-C96D].
Retrospective review is not given much attention in IPI’s 2020 Transition
Guidance, although IPI does advocate removing some of the distortions of the
regulatory review process, such as the “two-for-one” rule. See Jason A. Schwartz,
Enhancing the Social Benefits of Regulatory Review, INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY
N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., 6 (Oct. 2020), https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/
Enhancing_the_Social_Benefits_of_Regulatory_Review.pdf.
77. See, e.g., Dep’t of Def. Plan for Retrospective Analysis of Existing Rules,
4 (Aug. 18, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/other/
2011-regulatory-action-plans/departmentofdefenseregulatoryreformplanaugust2011
a.pdf; Dep’t of State Final Plan for Retrospective Analysis of Existing Rules, 4
(Aug. 17, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/other/201
1-regulatory-action-plans/departmentofstateregulatoryreformplanaugust2011.pdf.
78. With this goal of fostering unbiased and independent retrospective
analysis of existing rules, IPI recommended that agencies appoint a review team of
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A. Existing AI Tools Harnessed for Deregulatory Aims
This section explores pilot retrospective review projects utilizing
two AI tools. The first, RegData, is a tool incorporating AI technologies
that has been exploited by the Mercatus Center in furtherance of an explicit
deregulatory agenda. It was used as part of a model that claimed that the
United States could have an economy 25 percent larger if there had been no
new regulations between the 1970s and today.79 A later generation of
RegData was used in comments supporting the HHS Sunset Provision rule
(discussed above).80 Scholars have “call[ed] into question prevailing
accounts that have relied exclusively on the quantification of regulatory
obligations” without giving due regard to offsetting benefits.81
RegExplorer, another tool incorporating AI technologies, has been
used by a number of state and federal governments to assist in retrospective
regulatory review. Deloitte initially piloted RegExplorer with the Canadian
federal government to identify the average age of regulations, the amount of
time elapsed since being updated, and semantic trends in regulatory
prescriptiveness.82 To date, its applications seem to reflect a deregulatory
bent. At the state level, Ohio recently used RegExplorer to identify and
eliminate rules that, per the algorithm’s determination, were redundant and
burdensome.83 And overseas, the Australian state of New South Wales
personnel separate from the authors of the initial rule. With regard to targeting
rules to review, IPI urged agencies to adopt clear and publicly available guidelines
for how they select rules ripe for review. Once selected, the retrospective analysis
should include a thorough and balanced review of a rule’s impact, including costs
and benefits as well as distributional effects.
79. Bentley Coffey, Patrick A. McLaughlin, & Pietro Peretto, The Cumulative
Cost of Regulations (Mercatus Working Paper), https://www.mercatus.org/system/
files/Coffey-Cumulative-Cost-Regs-v3.pdf. The model is developed in a one-sided
framework that considers costs (How restrictive is the rule? How complicated is the
rule? How many rules are there?) but ignores benefits.
80. James Broughel & Kofi Ampaabeng, HHS’s Innovative New Sunset
Regulation (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/hhs%
E2%80%99s-innovative-new-sunset-regulation.
81. Cary Coglianese et al., Unrules, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 1, 25), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=37018
41.
82. Craig Alexander and Aisha Ansari, Making Regulation a Competitive
Advantage 32, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ca/
Documents/finance/ca-en-making-regulation-comp-advantage-pov-aoda-v2.pdf.
83. Allen Bernard, Ohio using AI to cull old laws and streamline regulations,
TECHREPUBLIC (June 25, 2020), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/ohio-usingai-to-cull-old-laws-and-streamline-regulations/. Beyond merely flagging duplicate
rules, RegExplorer helped Ohio identify “how many functions in state government
require [people] to show up at a state office or fill out a form,” which the
government then used as a proxy for burden. Id.
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(NSW) also used RegExplorer to zero in on burdensome, onerous, or
outdated regulations. AI was used to help identify prescriptive or onerous
text that, for example, included words such as “shall,” “must,” “cannot,” or
“ought” (similar to RegData’s restrictions keyword metric).84 RegExplorer
also assisted in flagging paper-based procedural compliance activities, such
as publications of notices in newspapers, witnesses in person, or oaths, as a
proxy for “overly burdensome.”85
1. RegData
RegData includes a digitized domain of the Code of Federal
Regulations, the State Administrative Codes for 46 states plus the District
of Columbia, and Administrative Codes for Canada and Australia.86
RegData uses textual analysis to classify regulatory text by industry (by
NAICS [North American Industry Classification System] code), link
regulatory text to the implementing agency, and examine trends over time
in restrictive regulations.87 The Mercatus authors “use machine-learning
text-classification algorithms to predict which industry is primarily affected
by each obligation-imposing term.”88
The innovative Mercatus study used RegData to conduct
retrospective review in Canada.89 The authors primarily focused on the
linguistic complexity of regulations in order to categorize those due for

84. REGULATING FOR NSW’S FUTURE, NSW TREASURY 4 (July 2020),
https://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-07/FINAL%20Treasury%
20report%20210720.pdf.
85. Id. at 9–10.
86. See generally RegData US Technical Documentation, QUANTGOV,
https://www.quantgov.org/regdata-us-documentation [https://perma.cc/34D9-7LP
R]; State RegData, QUANTGOV, https://www.quantgov.org/state-regdata
[https://perma.cc/7RS3-QJ8E]; RegData Canada, QUANTGOV, https://www.quant
gov.org/regdata-canada [https://perma.cc/5S3Z-6YRY]; RegData Australia,
QUANTGOV, https://www.quantgov.org/regdata-australia [https://perma.cc/4H3B-7
THE] (discussing the sources of information which are contained in RegData
projects).
87. Omar Al-Ubaydli & Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData: A Numerical
Database on Industry-specific Regulations for All US Industries and Federal
Regulations, 1997-2012 4, 15, 17, 21, 38 (Mercatus Center, Working Paper, 2014),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/McLaughlin-RegData.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WT49-67ST].
88. Coglianese et al., supra note 81.
89. See generally Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData Canada: A Data-Driven
Approach to Regulatory Reform 1 (Mercatus Center, Policy Brief, 2019),
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulatory-analysis/regdata-canada-datadriven-approach-regulatory-reform [https://perma.cc/6CUT-3QWM] (discussing
the RegData Canada project).
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review.90 The authors posited that linguistically complex regulations place
an additional time and cost burden on regulated entities by requiring more
time to read and understand, and, due to the complexity, likely increasing
the number of attorneys needed for compliance.91
The study proposed several metrics for targeting regulations for
retrospective review. First, they considered sentence length.92 In Canada,
the Treasury recommends that regulations have twenty words or less per
sentence.93 The authors thus argued that regulations with longer sentences
should be subject to review or the sentences broken down. Second, the
study relied on a metric called “Shannon Entropy” which is used to measure
the rate at which new ideas are added to text.94 Shakespeare typically scores
between 9.0-9.7;95 the researchers suggested using the Shakespeare score as
a cutoff for review.96
While reducing complexity could certainly enhance readability, it
would not necessarily target regulations that are outdated. The AI-driven
technologies, moreover, are harnessed in an explicitly deregulatory fashion.
As Cary Coglianese and co-authors point out, RegData does not account for
“unrules” within regulatory text, which serve to alleviate obligations on
covered entities.97 This imbalanced focus on restrictive terms (obligations),
without noting the exceptions and exemptions, could cause a retrospective
AI tool to flag certain regulatory texts as overly burdensome or costly
when, in reality, the costs may be far below what the number of
“restriction” terms would suggest. In other words, agency use of the
RegData tools would likely target a high proportion of false positives (i.e.,
designating a rule as overly burdensome or costly when it in fact embeds
pressure valves).98
90. See id.
91. Id. at 4–5.
92. Id. at 5.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 5–6.
97. Coglianese et al., supra note 81. More explicitly: “[the RegData authors]
have used their results showing a nearly 20 percent increase in obligation-related
words since 1997 to caution against adding further regulation, claiming that
‘regulatory accumulation will continue to stifle economic growth.’ But the
Mercatus Center research does not take account of unrules.” Id. at 24–25.
Coglianese’s point is that “government regulation is far less onerous – and far more
flexible – than previously imagined” by Mercatus and others who use an
exclusively one-sided test. Id. at 3. Therefore, “[a] regulatory system can only be
understood as the net effects of both its rules and its unrules.” Id.
98. To remedy this issue, Coglianese et al. replicate the Mercatus Institute’s
methodology but expand the analysis to include obligation-alleviating terms such
as “waive,” “exempt,” or “exclude.” Comparing the ratio of obligation-imposing
and obligation-alleviating terms in CFR Titles labeled “Food & Drugs” and “Public
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Weighting an AI tool to minimize false negatives at the expense of
a higher false positive rate (like the above would suggest) better serves a
deregulatory agenda. Successful pursuit of a deregulatory agenda, however,
is conditional on the AI tool’s ability to estimate accurately the average cost
or burden of a rule (or component within a rule). RegData would seem to
come up short here, given its reliance on rather crude proxies.99 Partisan
(and nonpartisan) agendas for retrospective review would be better served
by employing precise parameters in an AI-leveraged regulatory analysis—
which leads us directly to the AI-driven tool known as RegExplorer.
2. RegExplorer
Deloitte’s RegExplorer, like RegData, runs on a domain of
digitized federal and state regulations (as well as several foreign
countries).100 It can view a regulation’s text in a machine-readable format
and discover how agencies regulate certain terms via its “Search” function.
It can also understand certain things about a given regulation, such as the
types of topics (“sub-topics”) the regulation discusses (e.g., “electrical and
nuclear industries”). AI is used to identify (within a particular confidence
interval) which topics are discussed by a given section of regulatory text.
Not only is the functionality of RegExplorer more sophisticated
than RegData, it is also more user-friendly. It is organized by tabs with
specific functions, all of which can be visualized through a dashboard. The
“Research” tab allows searching by the year of a regulation’s last edit and
the age of the regulation. The “Analyze” tab maps cross-references made by
a given part of a regulation to other parts of the CFR. Finally, the
“Compare” tab facilitates the search for regulatory overlap (i.e., do Reg A
and Reg B discuss the same things?).
AI tools may be particularly effective in terms of searching for
overlapping regulatory areas. AI technologies are used to determine
whether two agencies regulate the same topic areas.101 They can help to
Health,” for instance, the authors find a ratio of one obligation-alleviating term for
every 4.5 obligation-imposing words. This ratio was ranked the tenth and eleventh
most alleviating out of the 49 observed CFR Titles. Id. at 32. However, a high
alleviation-to-obligation ratio does not necessarily indicate more deregulation. For
one, it neglects to account for the deregulatory power of a given word in the
context of a rule or set of obligations.
99. Imprecision, moreover, decreases transparency in the process and in the
effects, further shrouding a potentially black box in opacity.
100. DELOITTE, REGEXPLORER, https://www.regulatoryexplorer.com (last
visited Mar. 3, 2021).
101. More specifically, neural networks were deployed to create topic clusters
of the CFR. See Daniel Byler, Beth Flores & Jason Lewis, Using Advanced
Analytics to Drive Regulatory Reform 8, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/public-sector/us-ps-using-advanced-analytics-
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build classification schemes linking text in the regulation to a particular
agency and industry. Whereas RegData has classifications linking text to
industry and agencies, the RegExplorer “Compare” function is much more
sophisticated. Such technologies can be used effectively to identify
regulations on similar topic areas directed at the same industry as
candidates for streamlining.
B. Future AI Tools Harnessed for Increased Efficiency and
Effectiveness
Looking to the future use of AI tools in the realm of retrospective
review, it is imperative for good governance aims to consider not only
factors that could predict regulations that have out-lived their usefulness,
but also those that could predict that a given regulation is outdated as a
result of being under-protective. Notwithstanding the fact that the Trump
Administration had an explicitly deregulatory agenda (as reflected in E.O.
13,771102 and 13,924103)—and as touted in HHS’s articulation of its “AI for
Deregulation” pilot104—the future use of AI-driven technologies in
retrospective review should not serve as a one-way deregulatory ratchet.
Academic commentators—and some pioneering agencies—have
touted the use of AI to sift through voluminous comments in the notice-andcomment informal rulemaking process.105 AI-driven NLP technologies
to-drive-regulatory-reform.pdf. The AI component identified close relationships
between regulatory texts (e.g. that the regulation of “boats” and “fishing ship”
share a common theme). After grouping CFR sections by topic, the tool produces
certain summary statistics about the clusters that could indicate the need for
updating, for instance, the difference in years between the oldest and youngest
section in a cluster. Id.
102. Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
103. Exec. Order No. 13924, 85 Fed. Reg. 31353 (May 22, 2020).
104. HHS Launches First-of-its-Kind Regulatory Clean-Up Initiative Utilizing
AI, supra note 63; Keckler, supra note 8.
105. See, e.g., Michael Livermore, Computationally Assisted Regulatory
Participation 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 977, 1027, 1033–34 (2018) (discussing
myriad benefits of leveraging NLP to help agencies sift through public comments,
particularly for the benefit of enhancing “the efficacy of political review, akin to
the role that cost-benefit analysis is thought to play by some commentators”);
Engstrom et al., supra note 7, at 59-60 (describing how the FCC used AI/ML tools
to identify duplicates, fake comments, and analyze sentiment in over twenty
million comments responding to the proposed net neutrality rollback); Cary
Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making
in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1172 (“[I]t is hardly
unimaginable today that agencies could automate entirely the notice-and-comment
rulemaking process, especially for the kinds of routine rules that make up the bulk
of government rules”); Cary Coglianese, A Framework for Governmental Use of
Machine Learning, ADMIN CONF. OF THE U.S. REP. 33 (Dec. 8, 2020),
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harnessed for retrospective review could, for example, (1) identify
comments that flag rules (or portions of rules) as burdensome and (2)
identify partisan valence with respect to a particular rule component by
matching partisanship of organization to sentiment (in favor or against) the
component or rule.106 With regard to searching for regulatory overlap, AI
tools might also be used to identify regulations where a high proportion of
comments name a topic heavily regulated by a different agency—as a
predictor of overlapping regulatory areas.
A potentially fruitful area for AI tools to exploit (which does not
yet appear to be part of the functionality of the above-described tools or
discussed in the academic literature) would be regulatory impact analyses.
By Executive Order, all significant regulations must be accompanied by a
cost-benefit analysis.107 Over time, certain elements of this cost-benefit
analysis have changed. AI-driven technologies might identify comments
that criticize the cost-benefit analysis as insufficient.
Relatedly, an AI tool might specifically probe the value-of-astatistical life (VSL) methodology. There is no uniform VSL across
agencies.108 Agencies independently choose how to calculate VSLs.109
While, historically, agency VSLs have varied dramatically, more recently,
agency VSL values coalesce in the range between $6 and $9 million.110 In
2010, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set the
VSL at $9.1 million—while considering placing a 50% premium on cancer
deaths—the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) used a VSL of $7.9
million (increasing its 2008 estimate by over half), and the Department of
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Coglianese%20ACUS%20Fina
l%20Report.pdf (describing AI’s capacity to improve public engagement, and
noting the CFPB’s efforts to incorporate AI to manage the “unprecedented volume”
of comments and complaints from interested parties).
106. While public commentary can and should continue to be a useful tool,
given the lack of engagement, we may also want to consider using other data as a
proxy for public sentiment. For example, Google Trends track the relative
frequency of different search terms—it may be possible to discern which types of
regulations are on the public’s mind.
107. The content of these analyses is described in more detail in Circular A-4.
Circular A-4, OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET (Sept. 17, 2003), https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/ [https://perma.cc/8286-MD28].
108. In 2012, the Institute for Policy Integrity submitted comments to thenOIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein, urging that unifying the VSL across agencies
should be a priority. Inst. for Pol’y Integrity, Public Comments: Recommendations
to Promote Interagency Coordination (May 10, 2012) https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2012_cb/comments/ipi-interagencycoordination-final-comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJL7-MMZ2].
109. Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CALIF. L. REV.
1423, 1437 (2014).
110. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY
STATE 94 (2014).
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Transportation used a value of $6 million.111 A 2017 White House Report
notes that only three agencies have issued guidance on VSL calculations,
but that “[i]n practice, agencies have tended to use a value above the midpoint of” the range of VSL provided by Circular A-4.112 Agency VSLs are
subject not only to substantial inter-agency variation, but also intertemporal variation. Estimates of VSL have increased dramatically over the
past few decades, even after accounting for inflation. For example, the
Department of Agriculture’s VSL was $3.6 million in 1994, but $8.9
million by 2016.113 Similar increases have taken place in HHS, the FDA,
and the EPA.114
Regulations that use an outdated VSL estimate are at risk of underprotecting public health.115 For example, considering the steep increase in
the FDA’s VSL estimate between 2008 and 2011,116 it is possible that rules
that were considered overly burdensome in prior administrations may no
longer be sufficiently protective. Regulations promulgated without any
cost-benefit analysis may also be at risk of being under-protective.117
Livermore and Revesz explain this paradox in part by noting that, absent a
cost-benefit analysis, industry may be able to influence the agency in a
fashion not “exposed to the scrutiny of notice-and-comment rulemaking.”118
Consequently, regulations devoid of a cost-benefit analysis may be ripe for
retrospective review.
111. Binyamin Appelbaum, As US. Agencies Put More Value on a Life,
Businesses Fret, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011) https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17
/business/economy/17regulation.html [https://perma.cc/596Z-LQ62].
112. OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET: OFF. OF INFO. AND REG. AFF., EXEC. OFF.
OF THE PRESIDENT, 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED
MANDATES REFORM ACT (2017).
113. Dave Merrill, No One Values Your Life More Than the Federal
Government, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2
017-value-of-life/ [https://perma.cc/8K89-XQ9Z].
114. Id.
115. On a related note, there was a period wherein the EPA applied a “senior
discount” to the VSL for older individuals. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E.
Aldy, Labor Market Estimates of the Senior Discount for the Value of Statistical
Life, 53 J. OF ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 377–78 (2007). This practice has since fallen
out of favor. Merrill, supra note 112. It may well be that other agencies have had
similar overhauls in their cost-benefit analyses—and AI tools could thereby assist
in identifying.
116. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based
Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1185–86 (2014).
117. In Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Standards, Livermore &
Revesz find that the health-based National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) have been set at levels that “are less stringent than those that would
result from the application of a cost-benefit analysis.” Id. at 1258.
118. Id. at 1247.
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III. GUARDRAILS FOR AI IN RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW
As AI-driven technologies are integrated into retrospective review
or other rulemaking processes, it is critical that the uses align with
underlying administrative law values of transparency, accountability, public
participation, and oversight. The Trump Administration’s December 3,
2020, “Executive Order on Promoting the Use of Trustworthy Artificial
Intelligence in the Federal Government”119 emphasized that “[t]he ongoing
adoption and acceptance of AI will depend significantly on public trust.” 120
Agencies are therefore admonished to “design, develop, acquire, and use AI
in a manner that fosters public trust and confidence.”121
These general principles are relevant to the use of AI in
retrospective review. Especially relevant are the Executive Order’s
mandates that the AI be: (i) “[u]nderstandable” (“Agencies shall ensure that
the operations and outcomes of their AI applications are sufficiently
understandable by subject matter experts, users, and others, as
appropriate.”);122 (ii) “[r]esponsible and traceable” (“The design,
development, acquisition, and use of AI, as well as relevant inputs and
outputs of particular AI applications, should be well documented and
traceable, as appropriate and to the extent practicable.”);123 and (iii)
“[t]ransparent” (“Agencies shall be transparent in disclosing relevant
information regarding their use of AI to appropriate stakeholders, including
the Congress and the public, to the extent practicable.”).124
Transparency is key for meaningful public participation and
oversight. As OMB has recognized, “[i]n addition to improving the
rulemaking process, transparency and disclosure can increase public trust
and confidence in AI applications by allowing (a) non-experts to understand
how an AI application works and (b) technical experts to understand the
process by which AI made a given decision.”125
There is a burgeoning academic literature that discusses the
promise and peril of AI, highlighting the administrative law values of
transparency and reasons-giving.126 An intriguing emerging question is the

119. Exec. Order No. 13960, 85 Fed. Reg. 78939, 78939 (Dec. 8, 2020).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 78940 § 3(e).
123. Id. at § 3(f).
124. Id. at § 3(h).
125. OMB AI Memo, supra note 3.
126. E.g., Coglianese, supra note 105, at 5-6 (arguing that the success of
digital algorithms in a given use case will depend on certain preconditions, such as
“a well-defined objective for repeated tasks for which there exist large quantities of
data on outcomes and related correlates”); Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence
Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399 (2017) (identifying a
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extent to which AI algorithms are (or should be deemed) “rules” subject to
the APA. Most commentators divide uses of AI technologies into those that
“support” agency action—and therefore do not implicate the APA’s
directives—and those that “determine” agency actions and thus should be
subject to the full panoply of APA demands.127
Such line-drawing exercises marking a definitive divide between
“supportive” and “determinative” uses of AI technologies, however, may
have unintended consequences. For example, they might provide a “safe
harbor” (from notice-and-comment) to agency officials to pilot uses of
“supportive” AI technologies. This is not bad per se, assuming the
distinction is meaningful. But it does critically overlook the possibility that
the AI tool may over time gravitate over the line towards playing a more
policy-relevant “determinative” role.
The case study of HHS and its promulgation of the very first AI use
in rulemaking—without even divulging its use of Deloitte’s RegExplorer
AI tool—illustrates the potential peril. Several years into the HHS pilot, the
tool has yet to be vetted through the NPRM process; indeed, little to no
information about the tool has been provided to the public. While the tool
purportedly played a decisively “supportive” role, it remains to be seen
whether subsequent iterations will place the AI in a more “determinative”
position. Indeed, HHS was forthright with its determination to use AI in
retrospective review to implement the Trump Administration’s deregulatory

number of policy and institutional challenges posed by the application of AI to
various topic areas).
127. See, e.g., Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 105, at 1170 (setting forth a
spectrum of AI uses and hinging subjection of AI to APA §533 requirements on
whether the AI is used in a supportive or determinative role in the decision-making
process); Melissa Mortazavi, Rulemaking Ex Machina, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 202,
209–10 (2017) (“[S]ome uses of automated technology in rulemaking might
support agency action without violating the statutory requirements of the APA. For
example, removing duplicate submissions, when truly identical, appears to save
time with little substantive loss. This is a mechanical process, the equivalent of a
keyword search, which is a fundamentally different process from using an
automated analysis to sort comments based on fluid and adapting criteria.”).
Cuéllar and Huq have a more nuanced conception, looking at “what [the AI
systems] do” and in particular flagging uses that “embed a forward-looking policy”
in its structure as subject to APA dictates. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Aziz Z.
Huq, Toward the Democratic Regulation of AI Systems: A Prolegomenon (Univ. of
Chi., Working Paper No. 753, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3671011; see also
David Freeman Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho, Algorithmic Accountability in the
Administrative State, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 800, 837 (2020) (“[T]he extent to which
an algorithm binds will turn in significant part on the degree to which there is a
human in the loop—a question that is itself a highly subjective one and also likely
to change with informal shifts in agency practice.”).
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agenda.128 The real promise of AI for retrospective review lies in the
accountability and transparency behind how it works, so that when it
inevitably gets leveraged in a political way, courts and the public can
understand what is going on and react accordingly.
A. Disclosure and Soliciting Feedback on Retrospective Review Plans
Pursuant to what I have deemed the “old fashioned approach,”
agencies solicited public feedback on their retrospective review process.
Under the Obama Administration, agencies published Final Retrospective
Review Plans.129 Most agencies solicited feedback from the public as to
regulations that they thought required retrospective review.130 Some noted,
however, that this process did not result in a large number of comments.
For example, the Office of Personnel Management received only three
comments, none of which was actually related to the regulations the agency
had flagged for initial review.131 Other agencies had more success with
public outreach and also took a more direct approach to public engagement.
The Department of Labor, in developing both its preliminary and final
128. Chappellet-Lanier, supra note 8 (“Charles Keckler . . . shared the
agency’s ‘AI for deregulation’ pilot. The project, which began one year ago, aims
to use natural language processing to find HHS regulations that may be too
burdensome, obsolete or ineffective. The end goal, after subject matter expert
review, is to eliminate or change these regulations in order to streamline the HHS
regulatory environment.”).
129. All plans are available at: Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/oira/regulation-reform [https://perma.c
c/PR93-RR5M].
130. See, e.g., FINAL PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS PURSUANT TO
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13656, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. at 3 (Aug. 18, 2011)
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-regulatoryaction-plans/departmentofagricultureregulatoryreformplanaugust2011.pdf;
PLAN
FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING RULES, DEP’T OF COM., 8–11 (Aug.
18, 2011) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/other/2011regulatory-action-plans/departmentofcommerceregulatoryreformplanaugust2011a.p
df (describing each Commerce’s bureau’s solicitation of feedback); ENV’T
PROTECTION AGENCY, IMPROVING OUR REGULATIONS: FINAL PLAN FOR PERIODIC
RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS OF EXISTING REGULATIONS, 48–49 (Aug. 2011)
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-regulatoryaction-plans/environmentalprotectionagencyregulatoryreformplanaugust2011.pdf
(describing two comment periods yielding hundreds of written comments); DEP’T
OF THE INTERIOR, PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE REGULATORY REVIEW at 15–16, (Aug.
2011) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-regulato
ry-action-plans/departmentoftheinteriorregulatoryreformplanaugust2011.pdf.
131. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF
EXISTING RULES (Aug. 22, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/other/2011-regulatory-action-plans/officeofpersonnelmanagement
regulatoryreformplanaugust2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/GPZ2-SGSM].
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plans, created an interactive website; public engagement for the preliminary
plan drew over 940 users and 113 individual recommendations, stimulating
discussion and voting among users.132 The Social Security Administration
successfully solicited over four hundred messages to its “RegsReview”
email inbox—although most comments were unrelated to retrospective
review—and contacted nine hundred stakeholders and individuals.133 Under
the Trump Administration, HHS solicited comments to establish regular
review cycles (e.g., every four or ten years) but noted concern that doing so
could also result in a regulation being reviewed before industry has had the
opportunity to fully adapt; as a result, effectiveness could be
underestimated.134
But there is a seemingly sharp break with regard to the “AI for
Deregulation” plan. HHS did not publish, or otherwise make available to
the public, any of its metrics and progress made through the Regulatory
Review Task Forces. Moreover, in its first AI rulemaking, HHS explained
that the changes to existing rules were not material enough on their face to
warrant notice-and-comment. HHS would seem to be on firm ground—and
supported by existing academic commentary—that its AI technologies
played only a “supportive” role of the most mundane character. But this is
only the first step of an increasingly technologically-leveraged program that
is shrouded from public view and comment. Consider, for example, how the
sheer number of unreviewed regulations subject to the automatic sunsetting
provision would place increasing pressure on HHS to use an automated
(and perhaps a less supportive and more determinative) approach to
identifying and reviewing outmoded or overly burdensome regulations.135
For this reason—and contra the existing literature—I argue that this process
and the tool should also be subject to notice-and-comment.

132. See DEP’T OF LAB., PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING
RULES, 3–5 (Aug. 2011) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
other/2011-regulatory-action-plans/departmentoflaborregulatoryreformplanaugust2
011.pdf. The website appears to have continued in use until 2015. See Shaping
Smarter Regulations, DEP’T OF LAB. (last visited Jan. 2, 2021) https://dolregs.idea
scale.com/a/ideas/recent/campaign-filter/byids/campaigns/15893/stage/unspecified.
133. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FINAL PLAN, Exec. Order 13563 at 2 (Aug. 2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/other/2011-regulatoryaction-plans/socialsecurityadministrationregulatoryreformplanaugust2011a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NT57-R2WN].
134. See DEP’T HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., FINAL PLAN, 85 Fed. Reg. 70096
(Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-04/pdf/2020-23
888.pdf [https://perma.cc/AEE9-VKGF].
135. There does not seem to be a definitive tally of regulations subject to the
sunsetting provision. But given the fact that the NPRM noted that 85% of the pre1990 regulations had not been revised, 85 Fed. Reg. 70096, 70111 (Nov. 4, 2020),
it is likely to be quite significant.
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B. Notice-and-Comment for AI Supportive and Augmented Tools
The informal rulemaking process under the APA “provides
predictable and meaningful opportunities for interested stakeholders to
provide input on draft regulations and scrutinize the evidence and analytic
bases of regulatory proposals.”136 The APA requires agencies to “give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in rulemaking through
submission of written data, views, or arguments.”137
OMB has recognized the pivotal role that soliciting public input on
Notices of Proposed Rulemakings (NPRMs) relating to AI applications
plays in ensuring that “agencies will benefit from the perspectives and
expertise of stakeholders engaged in the design, development, deployment,
operation, and impact of AI applications” and in facilitating “a
decisionmaking process that is more transparent and accountable.”138
But, as mentioned at the outset of the article, HHS promulgated its
first AI rule—the “Regulatory Clean Up Initiative”—without notice-andcomment.139 HHS explained that the rule made non-substantive changes to
existing HHS regulations, such as “correcting references to other
regulations, misspellings and other typographical errors.”140 Indeed, this is
the very type of “supportive” AI use that academic commentators would
also place on the other side of the line, not subject to the dictates of the
APA, including notice-and-comment.
136. OMB AI Memo, supra note 3, at 13.
137. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1966).
138. OMB AI Memo, supra note 3, at 4, 13 (“Agencies must provide ample
opportunities for the public to provide information and participate in all stages of
the rulemaking process, to the extent feasible and consistent with legal
requirements (including legal constraints on participation to, for example, protect
national security and address imminent threats or respond to emergencies).
Agencies are also encouraged, to the extent practicable, to inform the public and
promote awareness and widespread availability of voluntary frameworks or
standards and the creation of other informative documents.”). Moreover, OMB has
recognized:
To the extent feasible, agencies should also provide opportunities
for stakeholder consultation before the NPRM stage, including
through the issuance, when appropriate, of RFIs and Advance
Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRMs) to inform decisions
about the need to regulate. Agencies should also consider holding
stakeholder and public meetings both prior to issuing an NPRM
and during the public comment period.
See also Exec. Order No. 13563, (Jan. 18, 2011) (noting that regulations “shall be
adopted through a process that involves public participation.”); Exec. Order No.
13859 (Feb. 11, 2019) (calling on agencies to increase public access to government
data and models where appropriate).
139. See supra Section I.B.2.
140. Regulatory Clean Up Initiative, 85 Fed. Reg. 72899 (Nov. 16, 2020).
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Consider how these seemingly innocuous categorizations may
either be used in a highly politicized way or else constitute the first step in
considerably more substantive endeavors. For example, what if the AI that
labels subtopics is used to flag industries that the HHS wishes to
deregulate? (Is this assisted/supportive AI or augmented/determinative AI?)
Or what if the use of AI to discover regulatory overlap is used by the HHS
in order to harmonize regulations by finding the least restrictive common
denominator? What if both of these tools are later on rolled into a larger AI
tool that flags “excessively burdensome” regulations?141
Now let’s take a closer look at these questions in the context of the
HHS’s use of AI for retrospective review. In HHS’s recent Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, “Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory
Evaluations Timely,” the agency explained:
The need for a Department-wide regulatory review process
is also supported by the Department's regulatory reform
project, which piloted an approach to augment expert
policy insights with AI-driven data analysis. Machine
learning surfaced a number of potential reform
opportunities, identifying over 1,200 CFR section citations
that merited consideration for reform and 159 CFR sections
that could benefit from regulatory streamlining based on
their similarities to other sections.142
HHS explicitly noted that AI augmented human insights to identify
“potential reform opportunities.”143 HHS’s pilot project formed the basis, at
least in part, for the new proposed rule. Here—and in its earlier rule—HHS
disclosed that AI was used to help identify “outmoded” regulations, but
there is nary a detail regarding how the AI worked or was used in the
process.144 Nonetheless, according to the proposed rule, “Regulations that
have become outmoded will be amended or rescinded.”145
141. Id. at 72899–90 (“Future uses of these technologies to promote
comprehensive and systematic retrospective review will continue to algorithmically
refine identification of potentially ‘outmoded’ regulations and will seek algorithmic
characterization of other regulatory targets of Exec. Order No. 13563—regulations
which are ‘ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome’, as candidates for
SME review and potential reform.”).
142. Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely, 85 Fed.
Reg. 70096, 70111 (Nov. 4, 2020).
143. Id. And to what extent does it matter from a procedural/transparency
perspective whether a human or AI tool is doing the flagging for a particular
(non)innocuous action? It might even be better from a transparency perspective if
we had the AI tool doing the less innocuous task because in many ways it is more
scrutable than a person.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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The proposed rule points to various factors used to target
regulations for retrospective review. AI technologies—especially in light of
the functionalities of the RegExplorer tool—could play a significant role in
many of them (although HHS does not take the opportunity to discuss this).
First, the proposed rule mentions “[t]he continued need for the Regulation,
consideration of which shall include but not be limited to the extent to
which the Regulation defines terms of sets standards used in or otherwise
applicable to other Federal rules.”146 And it also points to “[t]he extent to
which the Regulation overlaps, duplicates or conflicts with other Federal
rules, and, to the extent feasible, with State and local governmental rules.147
As discussed above, the RegExplorer tool’s “Compare” function, which
uses AI (subtopic classification) to identify areas of regulatory overlap, is
poised to assist here. Second, the proposed rule adverts to “[t]he complexity
of the regulation.”148 Recall that RegData attempts to identify this as well,
and RegExplorer may offer an AI-based augmentation.149 Third, the rule
highlights “[t]he degree to which technology, economic conditions, or other
factors have changed in the area affected by the Regulation since the
Regulation was promulgated or the last time the Regulation was reviewed
by the Department.”150 AI would define the “area” i.e., the “subtopic.”
Additionally, RegExplorer would generally be useful to quickly flag
regulations which have not been reviewed for a while.
HHS should identify where AI will come into play in the
assessment of these retrospective review factors. By neglecting to inform
the public of where AI will sit in the review process, no one will be able to
provide meaningful feedback on HHS’s use of AI (and specifically
Deloitte’s RegExplorer tool) to perform different tasks.151 HHS should also
provide further details describing when and how the AI will be used to
“support” or “augment” human decision-making. Thus, for example, to
return to the factor regarding overlapping, duplicative, or conflicting
regulations, HHS might disclose something akin to: “To identify such

146. Id. at 70121.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Ethan Greist, How to Use QuantGov, QUANTGOV (Jan. 1, 2020),
https://www.quantgov.org/how-to-use-quantgov
[https://perma.cc/259K-2BET].
RegData apparently utilizes a keyword search for “restrictive" terms like “shall,”
“may not,” “must,” “required,” and “prohibited.” A more sophisticated AI
application of this keyword search would be to apply what RegExplorer did with
subtopic analysis to restrictiveness. In other words, the same way an algorithm uses
machine learning to identify that “fishing boat” and “ship” talk about the same
thing, it would use the restriction keywords like “shall” or “must” to train the
model to identify other restriction terms.
150. Securing Updated and Necessary Statutory Evaluations Timely, 85 Fed.
Reg. 70096, 70121 (Nov. 4, 2020).
151. See generally Cuéllar & Huq, supra note 127, at 18–19.
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regulations, RegExplorer, an AI tool developed by Deloitte, was used to
identify topics (e.g., “dog” or “ice cream”) and industries (e.g., “electrical
engineering”). Any topical overlaps for definitional disparities were then
flagged for human review.”
But here, I would push even further—especially in light of the fact
that the “human in the loop” has garnered talismanic significance in terms
of shielding AI uses from disclosure and review by casting them in a
“support” role.152 The APA’s notice-and-comment mandate has been
interpreted to require that agencies make publicly available the critical
information—including studies, data, and methodologies—underlying
proposed rules.153 In Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, the D.C.
Circuit remanded the EPA’s order establishing “standards of performance”
rules because the EPA’s failure to disclose the basic data relied upon
suppressed the ability for meaningful comment.154 Notably—and in light of
the existing line-drawing efforts to distinguish “supportive” from
“determinative” uses of AI—the data in question that was suppressed
merely represented “a partial basis” for the overall rule.155 Four years later,
Nova Scotia struck down an FDA rule for “failure to disclose the basic data
relied upon,” which in turn obviated any opportunity for meaningful
comment on the proposed rule.156 The threshold set by Ruckelshaus and

152. Vikram Singh Bisen, What is Human in the Loop Machine Learning: Why
& How Used in AI?, VSINGHBISEN (May 20, 2020), https://medium.com/vsingh
bisen/what-is-human-in-the-loop-machine-learning-why-how-used-in-ai-60c7b44e
b2c0 [https://perma.cc/G24T-DF24].
153. See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
154. Id. at 402.
155. Id. at 392 (finding a critical defect in the decision-making process in
arriving at the standard under review in the initial inability of petitioners to
obtain—in timely fashion—the test results and procedures used on existing plants
which formed a partial basis for the emission control level adopted, and in the
subsequent seeming refusal of the agency to respond to what seem to be legitimate
problems with the methodology of these tests) (emphasis added). See also id. at
393 (“It is not consonant with the purpose of a rulemaking proceeding to
promulgate rules on the basis of inadequate data, or on data that [in] critical degree,
is known only to the agency.”). But see Cooling Water Intake Structure Coal. v.
United States EPA, 905 F.3d 49, 78 (2nd Cir. 2018) (“Unless the scientific material
discussed in the biological opinion ultimately formed the ‘basis’ of the EPA’s rule,
the public was not entitled to comment on it.”) (citing United States v. Nova Scotia
Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
156. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (“To suppress meaningful comment by failure to disclose the basic data
relied upon is akin to rejecting comment altogether. For unless there is common
ground, the comments are unlikely to be of a quality that might impress a careful
agency. The inadequacy of comment in turn leads in the direction of arbitrary
decision-making.”).
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Nova Scotia, requiring disclosure of the basic data underlying the rule,
points in the direction of agency disclosure of training data.157 Thus, in
addition to HHS disclosing how Deloitte’s RegExplorer tool was used, the
agency should provide information about the training data, the process for
classifying subtopics, how the clustering algorithm works and with what
accuracy.
Of course, disclosure and public participation can be taken too far.
Two sets of caveats are typically invoked. First, “current technical
challenges in creating interpretable AI can make it difficult for agencies to
ensure a level of transparency necessary for humans to understand the
decision-making of AI applications.”158 Second, “[w]hat constitutes
appropriate disclosure and transparency is context-specific, depending on
assessments of potential harms (including those resulting from the
exploitation of disclosed information), the magnitude of those harms, the

157. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Rulemaking and Inscrutable
Automated Decision Tools, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1851, 1882–83 (2019) (arguing
that, in order to provide adequate accountability and a generalizability check on the
AI tool, an agency must publish “information treated as part of the record for
backing up the rule” including “summary information about the training data,
explanations about how it was sourced, descriptions of validation process, and
validation results”). Other scholars coalesce around a similarly granular level of
disclosure. Aziz Huq recommends that a “datasheet” accompany an algorithmic
decision, that “records the choices and manipulations of training data, and the
‘composition, collection process, recommended uses, and so on’ of the raiding
data.” Constitutional Rights in the Machine Learning State, 106 CORNELL L. REV.
48 (2020) (referencing Timnit Gebru et al., Datasheets for datasets, arXiv preprint
ariv:1803.09010, at 2 (2018)). Coglianese & Lehr suggest that there should be
disclosure of “all iterations of an algorithm or alternative algorithms that were
considered, their predictions, and their corresponding specifications.” Coglianese &
Lehr, supra note 105, at 1211.
158. OMB AI Memo, supra note 3. Trade secret protection issues are often
raised at this juncture. See, e.g., David Rubenstein, The Outsourcing of Algorithmic
Governance, YALE J. REG. (Jan. 19, 2021) (“When procured from private vendors,
AI systems may be shrouded in trade secrecy, which can impede public
transparency and accountability.”), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-outsourcingof-algorithmic-governance-by-david-s-rubenstein/. Strandburg and Huq dismiss
these concerns for different reasons. For Strandburg, if confidentiality agreements
or trade secret protections would prohibit the disclosure of summary information
regarding the training data (e.g. sourcing, validation techniques, and results), then
rulemaking entities should not sign those agreements or source those technologies.
Strandburg, supra note 157, at 1882–84. Huq argues that protective orders solve
countervailing intellectual property concerns. Cuéllar & Huq, supra note 127, at 49
(“It is difficult to see how any of these disclosure obligations would impinge upon
intellectual property interests in algorithmic design, even on the assumption that
such an interest was a substantial one, given the availability of a protective order.”).
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technical state of the art, and the potential benefits of the AI application.”159
With regard to the use of AI in retrospective review, the oft-invoked worry
about adversarial gaming does not pertain due to the retrospective nature of
the activity.
CONCLUSION
Scholars have made valiant attempts to scale the level of required
disclosure to the significance of the AI in the process160 or the significance
of the policy in which it is embedded.161 But, as the HHS case study
illustrates, there is an unaddressed risk that a “supportive” AI role could
morph into an “augmented” one driving an automated search process that
uses some algorithm to propose rules for review that continues to evade
notice-and-comment and meaningful public scrutiny.162 A better solution
may be the establishment of a bright line for AI, requiring that an NPRM
always articulate (1) the policy-level purpose of the AIsupportive/augmented tool, (2) the factors it influences in the evaluation
process, (3) how it was trained or developed, and perhaps even (4) what it
may be used for in the future.

159. OMB AI Memo, supra note 3. Another possible concern/caveat, raised by
Strandburg, considers chilling effects or negative repercussions (e.g. pressure on
regulatory loopholes) of too much disclosure. If the bar for required NPRM
disclosure is too high, i.e. if it requires narrative mapping from cases to outcomes,
then “inscrutable decision tools simply cannot be incorporated into APA rules.”
Strandburg, supra note 157, at 1881. Also, with a high bar, people will either
prohibit the use of AI for significant rules (which is bad because of their benefits)
or officials will simply reinterpret or narrow the scenarios where explanation is
required. Id. at 1881–82.
160. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 105.
161. Cuéllar & Huq, supra note 127.
162. It is worth noting that disclosure must also be adequate for oversight by
various internal and external actors—a significant topic that must be taken up
elsewhere. Here, I highlight the significant role played by OIRA. OIRA has
historically played a coordinating role among federal agencies. The Trump
Administration’s December 3, 2020 “Executive Order on Promoting the Use of
Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in the Federal Government” charges OIRA with
extending its coordinating role in the sphere of AI: “When OIRA designates AIrelated draft regulatory action as ‘significant’ for purposes of interagency review
under Executive Order 12866, OIRA will ensure that all agencies potentially
affected by or interested in a particular action will have an opportunity to provide
input.” OMB AI Memo, supra note 3, at 7.

